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ACTION SHEET				
DATE REC'D IN IC	IC #			
DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED MATERIAL:				
TYPE OF MATERIAL	DATED			
FROM	TO			
SUBJECT				
DELIVERED TO	DEADLINE DATE	FOLLOW-UP DATE		
DIVISION ROUTING				
TO	DATE	ACTION REQUIRED	INIT.	COMMENTS*
1. DAD/C	12 Apr.		(JS)	<p>This is an attempt by Ted to clarify the intent of the JS on the requirements problem.. (JS)</p>
2. DAD/TC				
3. AD/SI	24 May		(JS)	
4. Ch/CS	17 May		(JS)	
5.	18 May		(JS)	
6.				

INSTRUCTIONS: Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column.

* If comments bear a higher classification than the attached material, the security classification of this sheet be changed.

FORM NO. 964 REPLACES FORM 75-3
1 APR 56 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

25X1

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1	DAD (C), SI		
2	Room 141 Barton Hall		
3			
4			
5			
6			
ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION	
X COMMENT	FILE	RETURN	
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE	

Remarks:

Attached is the paper on requirements (JSG Recommendations 21-23) which I mentioned to you today. I would appreciate your comments and criticism.

TMN

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FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
[redacted] 334 Admin. [redacted]			7 Apr 61
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GPO 1575
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30 March 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: (See Distribution)

SUBJECT : Joint Study Group Recommendations 21 - 23

1. The attached paper represents an attempt to interpret and develop the sense of Joint Study Group Recommendations 21 - 23 in the light of existing administrative and organizational realities. It does not necessarily represent, in whole or part, the views of the Assistant to the Director for Coordination, or of his staff. I hope, however that it will serve as a starting point for consideration of these recommendations, and how they may be translated into community wide actions.
2. I hope we can discuss this paper, at least in general terms, when we meet on Monday, 3 April.

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ATTACHMENT:

Draft Paper on Recommendations 21 - 23

DISTRIBUTION:

	INR/ICD, Dept. of State , ACSI ONI A D/P/CIA , DOD
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DRAFT - TMN
29 March 1961

1. An examination of that part of the Joint Study Group report devoted to requirements, as well as the text of Recommendations 21, 22 and 23, leaves some uncertainty as to the precise nature and function of the proposed "central requirements facility," and its identification with or relationship to the "interagency clearing house," and to the group of "top quality experts" "high level, experienced and fully cleared professionals" mentioned in the report.

2. It seems probable, however, that the Joint Study Group recognized two broad problem areas. The first area relates to the duplication, overlap, and multiplicity of requirements, and to the absence of any unit or focal point with complete records or knowledge of the whole.

3. The second ~~broad~~ problem area is that of managing the intelligence community's collection activities and resources as a whole. As the report states "The Joint Study Group believes that the described individual efforts of the members of the intelligence community to handle their own requirements and evaluations are inadequate to properly coordinate the collection activities of the community, and that the USIB must, as a part of its management responsibility, require that coordination be done on a community wide basis..." The high level, experienced professionals are to be "kept apprised of new assets and be informed about every form of collection resources."

4. A brief (and simplified) review of the sequential steps by which a requirement is developed, levied, and acted upon under existing procedures may be useful in clarifying and defining these two broad areas of concern and the JSG recommendations related thereto.

a. Before a requirement can be generated, one of the analysis or production offices must define and initiate work on a research project.* The procedures and provisions of NSCID's for coordination of intelligence production are, in fact, fundamental steps in the coordination of requirements. IAC-D-50/5.1, 11 June 1959 discusses this aspect of coordination of requirements in detail.

b. After initiation of work on a project, the analyst finds gaps in the information which he needs to carry on his research. The first step in obtaining the information he lacks is to seek it elsewhere than in his own files, that is to say, from the various organizations and facilities which record and file information and data on various subjects. The responsibility for seeking the information he needs from available reference and information repositories in Washington is, in the first instance, and primarily, a responsibility of the analyst. We do not believe that, in its statement "The first effort of such a clearing house would naturally be to check the available information in OCR and the usual public repositories and ensure that the required information is not already available in Washington," the JSG meant to relieve the analyst of this fundamental responsibility.

* Such a project may be a full fledged estimative paper, at one extreme, to the maintenance of current records (e.g., of the status of foreign airfields) at the other.

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c. Having ascertained that the information he needs is not available from the various reference facilities and repositories, the analyst reduces his need to writing. The "requirement" is now born. Usually the analyst's statement of need is accompanied by background and explanatory material so that it is comprehensible to a collector who may not be conversant in detail with the particular subject.

d. The determination of which collection facility should be given responsibility for actually obtaining the needed information is accomplished in stages. Frequently the analyst himself, based on his own knowledge, makes a determination and tailors his requirement to the collection facility he has chosen. This particularly occurs when the subject matter on which the analyst is working falls with the categories of his agency's responsibility for overt collection under NSCID No. 2. The second step in the determination of the collection facility to be used is made by the requirements unit belonging to the analyst's agency or office. These requirements units have, or should have, a thorough knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of the various collection facilities available in the community, and their determination of the appropriate collector is usually the one finally adopted.

e. The requirements units in State, Army, Navy, and Air Force receive all requirements originating within their agencies. Those that can appropriately be met by collection facilities of their own agency are prepared and sent to the field. Those that can only appropriately be met by the facilities of another agency

are sent to that agency. Each of these requirements units also receives requests from the other agencies for collection, determines whether or not such collection should be undertaken, and if so, issues the necessary instructions. In CIA, both production and collection elements have requirements units. Those units in the production elements perform the functions indicated in d., above. Those units in the collection elements of CIA, and in NSA, determine whether or not a given requirement should be met by their respective collection elements, and control and administer the levying of the requirement.

5. The existing requirements units perform functions which are essential to and inherent in the administration and direction of the component or office of which they are a part. We do not believe, therefore, that any "central requirements facility" or "inter-agency clearing house" can replace or carry out the functions of the existing requirements units; although it may be able to assist these units in meeting their responsibilities with a consequent reduction in the numbers of personnel required in these units.

6. Each of the existing requirements units operated within a limited and specific area. It is thus possible, for example, for identical requirements to be levied in sequence for overt collection by different agencies, since there is no convenient mechanism by which one agency can determine if a given requirement has already been levied on any collection facility other than its own. For those subject areas in which there is an overlap of interest, (for example, telecommunications, transportation, industry, science, technology) duplication of requirements

and of collection effort is specially liable to occur. The proposed "inter-agency clearing house" would, inter alia, provide a means by which such duplication could be identified and eliminated.

7. Recognizing that the existing requirements units must continue to function, and assuming that requirements can be subjected to control by punch card or other machine methods, we would suggest the following mechanism for the "inter-agency clearing house": (a) all requirements originating in one agency but addressed to another agency for collection, would be sent to the second agency through the clearing house, for recording and indexing; (b) all requirements originating in the production offices of CIA would be processed through the clearing house for recording and indexing to the selected collection facility; (c) requirements originating in any agency (except CIA) and levied for collection on a facility of that same agency would not be sent initially through the clearing house. However, in all such cases, a copy of the requirement would be promptly furnished to the clearing house for record and index purposes. In addition, inter-agency arrangements will be necessary so that the clearing house can be informed of the fulfillment, cancellation, or other changes in the status of requirements. JSG recommendation 22 proposes that CIA/OCR provide the reference facility for the "new central requirements facility." We interpret this as meaning that, in addition to library and information reference service, OCR would maintain a central record of requirements, generally in accordance with the procedures outlined above, using its machine facilities and resources as necessary for the purpose. The record and index facility should be

readily available to analysts and to requirements units, for the purpose of identifying requirements, and the status thereof, which may exist on any given subject of interest, based upon the Intelligence Subject Code.

8. If organized as briefly sketched above, the clearing house should provide on short notice information on: (a) the existence (and details) or non-existence of requirements on any given subject; (b) the status and details of all existing requirements on a subject, area, originating office, or collector basis, or any combination of these. The clearing house or record facility operated by CIA/OCR would have no authority itself for altering or rejecting a requirement or for determining the collector upon which a requirement would be levied. Its function would be that of providing a central and comprehensive source of information on requirements which have been prepared and levied upon collection components. The decision as to which collector would be requested to fulfill a requirement would rest (as in the majority of cases it does in practice today) with the requirements unit of the originating office or agency. Requirements units in production offices should be encouraged to consult directly with collectors with regard to the latter's capabilities, limitations, and problems, and to arrange, as appropriate, direct contacts between analysts and collection personnel. Nevertheless, the information available from the OCR clearing house facility would be indispensable to the top level professional group recommended by JBG. We do not believe that the JBG intended that this group of top level experts would review individually and pass upon every requirement emanating from the elements of the community.

9. Within the last five years there has emerged a new type of requirement with which the existing requirements system is unable to cope. This type of requirement is usually related to a high priority intelligence problem, and is usually (although not necessarily) concerned with science and technology. It has one or more of the following characteristics: (a) it is of interest to two or more agencies; (b) no single collection facility can fulfill it; (c) several or most collection facilities can contribute to it fragmentarily; (d) no combination of existing collection facilities can meet it adequately; (e) it requires extensive background briefing and explanation to be understood by collectors. The burden of this type of requirement falls heavily upon the clandestine services, upon whom it is usually levied in the absence of any identifiable overt capability to fulfill it. On occasion this type of requirement is levied indiscriminately on all collection facilities. We believe the JBG had in mind this type of requirement as the principal area for consideration by the group of high level, experienced professionals drawn from each agency.

10. This professional group through their collective knowledge of all collection resources, could identify and integrate the contribution each collector might make toward meeting a given requirement of this kind. A recent experiment concerning requirements on operational ICEM's sponsored by the DD/I may be illustrative of the kind of analysis and allocation of effort which the group could make. Through its knowledge of capabilities and limitations, the group could undertake or sponsor studies or collection aides designed to assist certain collectors

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to increase their capability to meet a requirement. The Scientific Intelligence Collection Aids issued by OSI are examples, oriented toward the clandestine services, of this type of activity. Thirdly, the group could identify needs which could ^{not} be met by any existing collection mechanism, and hence would require the development of entirely new collection techniques or devices. Similarly, the group could assess the value of a proposed new technique or facility, weighing it against present capabilities. On the basis of data supplied by the proposed OCR facilities the group could identify areas of weakness in existing collection capabilities and recommend reallocation of resources and effort. In carrying out the activities outlined above, the group would use the services, as appropriate, of such existing USIB committees as SIC, GMAIC, JAEIC, etc. It should also be noted that the present responsibilities and functions of USIB committees concerned with specific collection activities (e.g. IPC, Domestic Exploitation, COMINT, etc.) would not necessarily be altered.

11. The JSG did not indicate or recommend any organizational location for the inter-agency group of top quality experts. There ^{are} _A a number of alternative locations for this group, of which the following might be mentioned: (a) the group could function under the general supervision of the DCI's Coordination Staff; (b) the group could be constituted as a committee of USIB (c) conceivably the group, as the top level advisors to USIB on requirements and collection matters, could be constituted as a committee, with the existing USIB committees concerned with specific collection facilities (IPU, Domestic Exploitation, COMINT,

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ELINT, GCPC, etc., becoming its subcommittees. It is certain, however,
that if this group is to bring about the improvements contemplated by
the Joint Study Group, it must be composed of the very best talent,
initiative, and competence available in the intelligence community.

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